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Authors: Nigel West
Double Cross in Cairo (30 page)
34. About mid-March 1943, after making continued applications and bribing the medical official concerned, Levi obtained authority to be sent to the Civil Hospital at Foggia. He states that at that time he was seriously ill and needed treatment for cardiac trouble, which had been aggravated by the rigours of the island climate. He remained in this hospital for about a month and was then sent back to the island. On return he immediately resumed his attempts to return to hospital, as by this time the physical and psychological
strain of living on the island was bearing heavily on him and he realised that if he did not get away again he would have a serious breakdown.
(During his stay on the island several people went out of their minds and others deliberately committed offences against the regulations in order to be given sentences to be served in civil jails on the mainland.)
Levi succeeded in returning to the hospital at Foggia for the second time in mid-May 1943 on the pretext that his teeth badly needed attention. He remained in hospital until 19 August 1943. During this period and also during his first visit to the hospital, he received visits from his relations in Genoa, his stepfather being a very frequent visitor. The latter had been trying to arrange for Levi’s transfer from the island to the mainland and had hopes of arranging this through the Police Commissioner of Foggia, with whom he was on good terms.
A few days before 19 August the Police Commissioner fetched Levi from hospital and took him to the provincial doctor, who had been ‘fixed’ by Levi’s stepfather and who wrote out a certificate recommending on medical grounds that Levi should be transferred to the mainland.
35. On 19 August 1943 Foggia was heavily bombed by the USAAF and the hospital was rendered unserviceable. The majority of the fifty political prisoners from Tremiti who were in hospital at this time took the opportunity of escaping during the general chaos and confusion of the bombing. Levi himself, with three or four other prisoners, remained behind to assist the medical staff in dealing with the wounded. The hospital was ordered to close down and transfer all patients to the civil hospital at San Severo. Levi assisted in the evacuation of the patients and left with the last truck, which arrived in San Severo in the early hours of 20 August 1943. There was no accommodation available in the civil hospital for the political prisoners, who were put in the military hospital. They were not guarded as all the carabinieri had run away, and could have escaped without difficulty, but they considered that as they had no documents of identity it
would be advisable to remain in the military hospital and await orders for their release. They were expecting such orders to come through at any time following Mussolini’s resignation one month earlier. The chief medical officer, however, on learning that there were some political prisoners among his newly-arrived patients, instructed the local carabinieri to remove them. The carabinieri did not know where to accommodate them, and, owing to the complete disruption of communications, had no means of sending them back to the island; they were accordingly handcuffed and put into the local gaol at San Severo. Levi remained here from 22 August 1943 until 17 October 1943 when he was released by Captain Cooley, AMG officer in San Severo.
36. Captain Cooley employed Levi as an interpreter-clerk. Levi states that in December 1943 he wrote a letter addressed to the British Military Intelligence authorities in Cairo giving a brief outline of events since returning to Italy. He gave this letter to Captain Cooley with a request that it should be forwarded. Some time elapsed, and by chance Levi found this letter which had remained in Captain Cooley’s office and had not been forwarded, accordingly Levi took steps to write a further letter, the onward transmission of which he arranged privately through contact in the Army Post Office, and which was received by the British authorities in Cairo on 18 February 1944.
III Comments
37. The pattern of Levi’s narrative provides very considerable evidence that the Italians, and not the Germans, were responsible for his arrest and confinement.
Levi himself believes that his arrest was due to Italian Secret Service jealousy of the Abwehr, Scirombo being the most jealous of all, having seen his
own espionage organisation in Egypt fail miserably, with the result that the Germans had to step in. This may well be true.
38. It seems likely that Alessi (although apparently employed by the Germans) was assigned the task by the Italians of making a check on Levi’s loyalty. His behaviour and approach to Levi were typical of the agent provocateur. The ‘slight suspicion’ on which Levi was arrested by the Italians may have been merely that he was too lukewarm in his devotion to the Axis, having failed to ‘inform’ on Alessi. The questions put to Levi concerning the wireless set being in British hands may have been shots in the dark with little or no basis of concrete suspicion.
39. It is probable that the Germans had no knowledge of the Italians’ intention to make trouble for Levi since Annabella telephoned him the day prior to his arrest to enquire on Rossetti’s behalf when he would be leaving to return to the Middle East.
40. Three weeks after his arrest, Levi was told by the Italian official conducting his interrogation that both Travaglio and Rossetti had given him excellent references and were prepared to re-employ him once his case was settled. Again, in October 1941, Levi was asked whether he would be prepared to re-enter the service of the Germans if he were released.
According to reports from Most Secret sources, Rossetti (in Istanbul) received information from Scirombo in early April 1943 that Levi was to be released. Rossetti requested that Levi should be sent to Sofia or Athens and put at his disposal. Evidently the decision to release Levi was cancelled, as on 27 May 1943 Rossetti was asking Athens what had happened to Levi.
41. We know from Most Secret sources (original not at present available in Cairo) that in November 1941 the hand of the British Intelligence Service was regarded by the Germans as apparent in the
CHEESE
traffic. This
would not necessarily compromise Levi in German eyes as they might well consider that Levi’s agents had been captured or their organisation penetrated by the British authorities after they had been functioning for several months. Hence the fact that the Germans were apparently perfectly prepared, and even eager, to re-employ Levi.
42. The fact that the Germans apparently brought no serious pressure to bear on the Italians to secure Levi’s release is understandable. As far as they were concerned he had accomplished his main task by establishing wireless communications between Italy and Egypt. While with his past experience and British passport he would have been useful to them for further missions, the security of the wireless link already established was strengthened at their end with Levi out of the way in gaol. Travaglio too probably preferred to see Levi in prison since he realised, no doubt, that the longer Levi continued to be employed by the Germans, the greater the possibility that his activities as a double agent would come to light. This in turn would present Travaglio himself in an unfavourable light as an incompetent who had been deceived by two double agents,
JEAN
and Levi. While Travaglio, to save his own skin, was perfectly prepared to defend Levi in June 1941 against the charge of having been a Deuxième Bureau double agent, there would be no reason why he should exert himself on Levi’s behalf if Levi were in trouble for other and less serious reasons, which would appear to have been the case when Levi was arrested by the Italians.
43. The present interrogation of Levi has thrown no light on the problem of the manner in which the re-establishment of
CHEESE
was effected after November 1941.
44. It is apparent that Levi conducted himself with considerable fortitude during the course of his interrogations and while confined for two years in circumstances which broke the health and spirit of other prisoners on the island.
He does not appear to be in the least embittered by his experiences and is genuinely willing to undertake any further work which may be offered him.
• • •
Since the above notes were written Levi has given the following additional information on the habits of the Abwehr officials in Italy:
45. Levi often acted as unofficial agent for black market exchange transactions on behalf of Rossetti, Annabella and Travaglio, particularly the latter. These Abwehr officials were supplied with American dollars with which to finance their agents. Instead of paying them in dollars, however, Rossetti and Travaglio would have the dollars changed into Italian lira on the black market obtaining almost twice as many lira to the dollar as was possible at the official rate of exchange, thus making substantial private gains. On one occasion in 1940 Levi was arrested in Genoa by the Italian police when attempting to change several thousand dollars on the black market on behalf of Rossetti. He was released after a few hours as Rossetti interceded with the Italian authorities and apparently convinced them that Levi had really been carrying out a secret investigation into black market activities. On another occasion Rossetti insisted that the Italian Police should release two Italians who had been arrested while carrying out similar black market transactions on behalf of the Germans.
Levi’s detailed knowledge of the fact that German Abwehr officials in Italy were exploiting their official position and funds to make considerable sums of money for themselves by illegal black bourse activities may have been a strong factor influencing both Travaglio and Rossetti against making serious efforts to obtain Levi’s release.
During this period of debriefing, Levi was accommodated in Cairo and measures were taken to prevent the arrival of ‘Mr Rose’ from being
noticed by anyone who had known him previously. When questioned about this, Levi identified just three people who might remember him. They were: the porter at the National Hotel; George Khouri, who was still in an internment camp; and a journalist, Habib Jamati, to whom Levi had been introduced by Khouri, and SIME attempted to trace. Meanwhile James Robertson conducted a preliminary interview with Levi and decided that he had probably been imprisoned because of some rivalry between the Abwehr and Count Scirombo, one factor being that the entire Italian espionage system in Egypt had apparently gone to ground as soon as war had been declared in June 1940, a debacle that required the Germans to step in to rectify the situation. Robertson also speculated that Travaglio had been content to let Levi languish in an Italian prison where he would be unable to create problems for him with the Gestapo, on the basis that he had realised that Levi must have been a double agent, most probably for the French only. ‘There is no evidence however, that Travaglio or anyone else knew him to be a
British
double agent, and whatever the Abwehr knew, it is clear from the visit to the Lido in June 1941 that Travaglio was sufficiently scared of the Gestapo or the Russian Front to keep his ideas to himself’.
2
Twenty-five days after D-Day: 1 July
I
n May 1944, ISLD put up a proposal to SIME and ‘A’ Force suggesting a scheme, codenamed Plan
JACOBITE
, which would greatly expand
CHEESE
’S
operations, and have him establish a network in Greece.
JACOBITE
envisaged that the original organisation in Cairo would be left in the hands of
MISANTHROPE
, now codenamed
MARIE
, and that
CHEESE
should travel to Greece so he could fulfil a counter-espionage mission and peddle false information about Allied activities across the Balkans coordinated by a sub-group of the 30 Committee designated the 39 Committee. The proposal to the Abwehr was transmitted by
CHEESE
on 29 August, together with a request for an address in Athens where he could collect a transmitter. As Douglas Roberts noted on 8 September,
From what we know of
CHEESE
’S
past history we are inclined to think it probable that the Germans will make some effort to comply with his proposal. In preparation for this provisional plans have been made during the past two months for the case officer to proceed eventually to Athens in order to be responsible for making use of the wireless set which we hope the enemy will leave behind for
CHEESE
. He will be accompanied, in the event of the
plan materialising, by our wireless operator, the latter being essential for the continuation of the link since his operating style has been well known to the Germans over the course of the past three years. After the transfer of
CHEESE
, it is our intention to continue to maintain the link from Cairo by making notional use of
CHEESE
’S
(of course imaginary) young woman friend, who is already well known to the Germans as a reliable sub-agent and who is believed by them to be a fairly competent wireless operator. For this purpose we have a second operator available in SIME.
If – as may occur very shortly – this plan is brought to fruition by our receipt from the Germans of definite instructions in regard to the address in Athens, I think it would be a pity not to make use of it, especially if it is remembered that
CHEESE
has served the enemy for three years and is likely therefore to be welcomed by them should he prove able to continue his service in another territory. The officer in charge of the case has had two years’ experience in double agent work and is most competent at his job.
By September all the various interested British agencies had agreed to the scheme, and, on 23 September, Roberts, who had by then succeeded Maunsell at SIME, wrote to ISLD’s Colonel Hill-Dillon to confirm that the Abwehr had also embraced the notion and had even buried a wireless set and a cache of gold in the Athens suburb of Psychiko. The project, which became known as the
ODYSSEY
, was originally intended for Pope as case officer and Rowley Shears as radio operator to move to Athens, but SIME decided that a new case officer, fluent in Greek, was required, a recommendation that was adopted. Accordingly, very detailed directions were relayed from Cairo to Athens so the treasure could be recovered. As a security precaution the Abwehr declined to send
CHEESE
an exact address but instead on 4 October gave him some extremely detailed instructions about where to find the buried transmitter and £10 in gold in the capital’s northern suburbs.
You go from the capital in the direction of Kifisia main road to Psychiko. Along the Kifisia road you will find a street called Pericleous on your right. Follow the street until the corner of Kyteropis Street and pay attention to the white house forming the corner of the two above-mentioned streets. The garden door of this house is in Pericleous Street and has a plate with the name Mitsopoulosis. From the corner where the white house is following Evtkopis Street in the same direction as the main road, that is to say, to the North. Now watch carefully on your left. From the approach to this white house, after a distance of about 40 metres, there is an isolated fig tree, then after 250 metres there are three pits resembling a kind of disused quarry. The last one, that is the biggest, has a sort of entrance or sunken path from the West formed by two big rocks covered with earth. This is the secret place. On entering the secret place immediately to the right on the ground there is a very white stone engraved with the letters XXX. Buried underneath, at about 30 centimetres, there is a black parcel, it is the cover of a little portable suitcase containing the instrument and the papers. The key is attached. You had better cut this rubber cover on the spot with your knife.
Now pass into the entrance and turn left. At a distance of about five paces you will see on the ground a stone formed by the rock resembling an artificial plaque. This stone is marked by a triangle engraved on it. Directly underneath this sign you will find a box containing 10 English pounds in gold.
Late in October 1944 the newly reopened SIS station in Athens was given the task of digging up the promised radio, an adventure which was summarised by one of the officers involved on 26 October:
We arrived on 23 October, a Monday, and immediately on entering the hotel recognised Brigadier Dudley Clarke. At a meeting the same evening it was decided that a search should be made as soon as possible. I offered to go out at first light on the 24th.
Wearing civilian clothes I went out in a car lent by MI9 to a spot on the
main Kifisia road. You will recall that I came away from GHQ more or less briefed to look on the left of this road for Pericleous Street and not on the right. This delayed me a little. But the German instructions proved extremely exact in every detail. I am returning to you the aerial photograph which I brought away from Cairo on which I have marked the streets Pericleous and Evtkopis, the white house and the three pits. I have put a spot of ink near the rock-like gates of the last pit – and you can even see the young fig tree at forty metres from the house.
I got out of my car and after some walking about looking at street names, I found Pericleous Street on the right-hand side of the road. My concern was not about the possibility of being accosted by another agent or being surprised by a booby-trap but about the ELAS bands who were roving the area and the streets of Athens arresting people they didn’t like. Pericleous Street brought me to a white house bearing the name Mitsopoulosis. I turned left and sure enough I found myself in Evtkopis Street. At forty metres I found the fig tree and two hundred and fifty metres further on the largest of three pits. They were certainly not quarries – mere diggings which people tended to use as refuse dumps for old tins.
It was now quite light but I decided that I could take the risk of going into the pit despite the proximity of houses on three sides. Going through the motions of obeying nature’s call, I left the street. The pit had, on the west side, exactly the entrance described, rather like a Minoan gate, twelve feet high.
You can see the gate in the photograph. On my right I found the white rock marked with an X, and taking five paces, I found the tablet-like rock marked with a triangle. In very high spirits I returned to the main road, found my car and went back to shave.
I reported to 39 Committee the complete success of my recce.
I decided to dig that morning and as a Greek speaker, Captain Lafontaine, offered to come with me and to remain in the car, I took only a clasp knife, a torch and my automatic. We left Athens by 0200 hours on 25 October. I was digging by 0230. After digging for the set for about three-quarters of an hour
I had made a hole about eighteen inches deep and two feet wide under the X marked on the rock. Our instructions were to dig 30 centimetres, about one foot. Then I heard a tin kicked. I passed through the gate and flattened myself against the sides of the shallow pit into which the gate leads. I waited five minutes. Again I heard a metallic click much nearer. It may have been an animal but I decided to return to the road. I made a detour and found the car. We drove a mile further along the Kifisia road and stopped. I decided to wait until the sky lightened and dig without having to use a torch.
I returned at about 0430 and dug beneath the X mark to a depth of two feet. Disappointed, I pushed back the earth and tried for the gold below the triangle. I reached a depth of eighteen inches and again had to fill in the hole. But it was still early enough to try once more. I returned to the car, obtained Captain Lafontaine’s help and return to the spot. We dug up both holes again to a good two feet in depth. We covered our traces before we returned to the car.
I felt now that my next attempt had to be made as soon as possible, and had to be, to some extent, final. I asked Rowley Shears to put on civilian clothes and come with me at 2200 on the 25th. Captain Lafontaine again remained in the car. Rowley and I dug to a depth of three feet square using pick and shovel. We found nothing and refilled the pits made.
The committee here has decided that it is not useful to continue digging and that security will be endangered by any further attempts. I did think of sounding the whole pit with a mine detecting apparatus – but I cannot believe that the German who was so exact in every detail of his instructions can made a mistake either in estimating the depth at which the set is buried, or the exact spot.
The possibilities are,
1. that the set was never buried. Either because the NCO detailed to bury it kept the gold and sold the set after making the markings on the rock, or else because the Germans had to leave prematurely,
2. that instructions were left with some post-occupational agent to buy a set for
CHEESE
after the departure of the Germans but that following the recent arrests of many stay-behind agents, these instructions have not yet been carried out,
3. that the Odyssey was a hoax – but I cannot believe this, particularly now that I have received your inward traffic of 22 October, [or]
4. that the set and the gold were stolen. But the ground at both places was solid and did not appear to have been disturbed. I noticed that the grass over the ‘gold’ spot did come away very easily and rootlessly. Otherwise my opinion is that the soil had not been touched for at least a month. We have had a lot of rain here lately – in fact my first dig took place in rain which drenched my clothes.
THE FUTURE
Obviously
MISANTHROPE
will have to report that
CHEESE
had written saying that he had had no luck. And we must wait for reactions. I am absolutely certain that I have found the right place, as you will when you look at the enclosed photograph which is remarkably clear. Mideast should scrap the Stadtplan of that area – it’s worse than useless. But it is possible that, despite the accuracy of the instructions in every other respect, the set may not have been buried ‘directement’ below the markings.
It is certainly not possible to continue digging for the present. The ‘reaction’ may encourage us to try harder in which case we can think again. But it would be a bad policy to continue merely because we can.
CHEESE
could make a set but the story would stink. The Hun knows well how little technical material is available here.
CHEESE
would have to claim that he had cut the crystals himself.
This report was to be a huge disappointment as ISLD reported to Cairo the same day.
Attempts to find
CHEESE
set and money unsuccessful. Place definitely located but both cupboards bare, with no sign of having been disturbed. Consequently
EFFIGY
and
PEDANT
of greater importance to
DOWAGER
. These cases now being developed.
CHEESE
will send letter to
MARIE
explaining position, on receipt of which suggest she inform employers and ask if they have any further instructions for
CHEESE
.
This crushing blow implied that
CHEESE
had reached the end of his usefulness, perhaps had even been abandoned by the Abwehr, which had established at least two stay-behind sources in Athens,
EFFIGY
and
PEDANT
, who were considered more valuable and were supporting a deception scheme codenamed
DOWAGER
(formerly
GALVESTON
). Unfortunately
PEDANT
, who communicated in Greek to the Abstelle in Vienna, supervised by Geoffrey Hinton, had to ‘lie low’ for a period but
EFFIGY
, who transmitted direct to Berlin in French, was unaffected. Certainly, from ISLD’s viewpoint, the situation was clear, and B Section would be fully occupied with running them as double agents.
On 12 January 1945
CHEESE
and, more specifically
MISANTHROPE
, were placed in jeopardy by the arrest in Greece by the local Deuxième Bureau of a German spy, Konstantinos Kossiadis, whose contact details had been supplied to her by the Abwehr just four days earlier as the person who had been entrusted with
CHEESE
’S
transmitter.
Kossiadis led his captors to an Abwehr IH I safe-house where a wireless transmitter was recovered. The capture of Kossiadis resulted in the detention of five other members of his stay-behind network, and the fear was, as articulated by British counter-intelligence officer Captain G. D. Klingopolos, on 24 January, that
a slight suspicion will certainly fall on
CHEESE
as a result of these arrests – if the Germans ever learn of them. The wireless agents so far captured were not working. But so many thousands of people have been arrested or transported in the last few weeks that suspicion will certainly be slight. After a lapse of some weeks
MISANTHROPE
should be able to report that
CHEESE
has searched in vain for the occupant of the empty house who was not known to the permanent inhabitants of the district.