Read Double Cross in Cairo Online
Authors: Nigel West
Double Cross in Cairo (7 page)
This signal had a profound impact on the Germans who appeared to accept the underlying implication that a weakened British army was in no condition to launch an imminent offensive. On 11 November, just a week before the
CRUSADER
campaign, the Akrika Korps advised that there âare no apparent signs of preparations for an attack on Cyrenaica' and in explanation directly referred to the Nicossof message:
Abwehr reports state that there are also differences of opinion between Generals Wavell and Auchinleck concerning strategy in the Middle East. Wavell advocates an attack into the Caucasus, but Auchinleck does not wish to move any more troops or equipment out of Egypt.
In a later assessment dated 6 January 1942, SIME reported in a telegram to MI5's headquarters at Blenheim Palace, with the address âSnuff-box, Oxford', that
CHEESE
/
LAMBERT
was the main source by which successful deception recently achieved, resulting in complete strategic surprise at onset of Western Desert campaign. Without
LAMBERT
, main theme of the deception plan which was put over on 20/10 and 27/10 could not have reached enemy before 18/11. This very satisfactory and completely justifies care and trouble taken.
LAMBERT
still in touch but doubt further utility.
In November 1941 the network in Cairo appeared on the verge of collapse because of lack of promised funds and George Khouri's (authentic) internment. Nicossof protested that he was merely the radio operator, unable to recruit and pay for agents, and himself heavily in debt. SIME had anticipated that after
CRUSADER
his value to the enemy would diminish, but despite having been patently wrong, his standing appeared initially to be unaffected. This created a further opportunity to be exploited, but exacerbated the problem of Nicossof's finding. Without sufficient cash, it was hardly credible that the improvident spy would continue to put his life at risk for an ungrateful employer. This issue had been considered several times, but SIME had assumed that Nicossof would be abandoned after the full scale of the
CRUSADER
debacle emerged, and the general view was that this sacrifice was probably worthwhile. Now the priority was to support Nicossof by transferring any blame to Nicossof's unreliable informants (whom he had been unable to pay) and assist the enemy by providing a suitable channel for passing the money he demanded. One reassurance was a message sent on 18 December promising that more than enough money had been in a neutral country âfor a long time' although there was no explanation for what had happened to it.
One obstacle was some evidence which emerged in
TRIANGLE
traffic in November 1941 and again January 1942 that Nicossof had come under suspicion and the Abwehr had begun to lose confidence in an agent codenamed
ROBERTO
, an individual who strongly resembled
CHEESE
. The first sign of trouble was a text which included the ominous comment that âthe intrusion of the enemy Intelligence Service into the
ROBERTO
network is becoming clearer and clearer.'
As well as the
TRIANGLE
material, there was other evidence of German suspicions. SIME noted âafter the New Year message of good wishes, there was a marked change'.
The enemy frequently failed to reply to, or even acknowledge our signals, and contact was seldom established more than once a week. His messages showed far less interest in military matters, and few questions were asked on military subjects. Traffic continued sporadically on the subject of the money which was said to be on its way, but enemy messages were such as to lead us to suspect that traps were being set. It was for instance proposed that the enemy should send the money to Istanbul and we should send someone to fetch it. This looked very like an attempt to kidnap a British agent on the Venlo pattern, or at least learn more of our organisation. We toyed with the suggestion over some messages, pleading lack of money for the journey and suggesting that we might find a âneutral merchant' to act as an intermediary. A scheme was tentatively laid on for action at Istanbul, but the enemy appeared to lose interest, and it was not thought wise to persevere.
Perhaps because of this shadow cast over the channel, between 1 January and 25 June 1942, only three items of any significance were conveyed to the enemy. They were reports that an American aircraft factory was being planned to be constructed just outside Cairo; that American military personnel had been seen in Cairo's streets, together with a description of three different shoulder-flashes; and the correct location of the GHQ Middle East building in Cairo. Requests for specific military information, such as the location of the 23rd Infantry Division and various Polish, Free French and colonial troops, and details of shipping in the Suez Canal, were simply ignored.
As an expedient on the issue of the factory, âenemy enquiries about site, capacity, etc. were first evaded then answered with the excuse that the agent who supplied the original information had disappeared'. On the American military personnel, âenemy enquiries for further details were met with a brief reply giving three shoulder-badges noticed'. As for the address of GHQ, it had actually been supplied several months earlier. SIME noted that
this had been asked for, and correctly answered, nearly a year before. The address is such common knowledge throughout the Middle East that a trap was suspected. But it is possible that the enemy is even more ignorant of conditions in Egypt than we suspect. His second enquiry may imply that he had lost record of the first, or that he thought there had been a move.
Evan Simpson registered severe reservations about the questions posed by the Abwehr, as John de Salis pointed out to Dudley Clarke on 18 May that
CHEESE'S
position was âvery precarious'.
Apparently Major Robertson had some information about him: âthe heavy hand of the British Secret Service is now apparent', do you know anything further about this? Up to now we have struck for money.
âSans argent, nouvelles militaires impossible
'.
Remuneration has been promised but no sums have as yet materialised. The enemy are now asking for information about your aeroplane factory, location, details of equipment and whether manufacturing or merely assembly shops.
Simpson is now unwilling to carry on with this theme unless you insist on it. In my opinion there are several disadvantages. Sooner or later we shall have to locate this factory and tie it up with an existing building/installation, thereby exposing a building to bombing. We shall have to decide whether it is a factory or an assembly shop. The first is unlikely, owing to local conditions â total absence of primary materials, tools and skilled personnel. The second would have to be linked up with an area where considerable activity is already taking place where the associated features of a large factory, lodging capacity, rail/water communications, are to be found.
The enemy are also anxious to obtain the exact location of GHQ. This was given correctly by us as Sh.E1 Birgas (i) There is no record in the file that GHQ had been consulted. (ii) This might be an indication that our message had not been received, but would appear to be much more likely a check on our veracity.
The solution, produced by de Salis on 19 May, was to focus on three distinct themes and give the enemy the impression
â That
LAMBERT
is, and remains, loyal to the enemy;
â That owing to the lack of funds he has been forced to employ âinferior' agents who had misled him and given him inaccurate and misleading information on â e.g. 18th Division;
â That he has now got rid of the lot and, should funds be available, he is now in a position to recruit better personnel who could and would produce the required information;
â With this new organisation we might allay the suspicion apparent ⦠and give us a possibility of having a new start.
SIME later recorded that
it was not until the latter half of June that anything further was transmitted. Even then, the matter supplied was first of low grade, though in order to build up confidence it had to contain a high proportion of truth. âA' Force was fortunately able to supply the enemy with information that he already possessed, new items that were unlikely to be of use to him, or truths that would probably confuse him more than a deliberate lie.
On 2 July the Abwehr suddenly expressed renewed interest and confidence in Nicossof and instructed him to begin transmitting daily, and
TRIANGLE
intercepts dated 4 and 12 July referred to him as âcredible' and âtrustworthy' although Athens noted that âthe reliability of this agent has not yet been proved'. SIME responded by having Nicossof welcome the chance to bring Rommel to Cairo
and suggested that the arrival of the Germans would enable him to receive some medals and have his debts repaid. It was also SIME's chance to convey
SENTINEL
, a deception plan designed to encourage a German offensive in the period 10â20 August when the 8th Army supposedly would be in an especially advantageous position, with plenty of anti-tank artillery and minefields, to resist the attack. The objective, of course, was to delay the enemy's impending attack until after 20 August when Auchinleck would have the benefits of reinforcements. In the event Rommel, with only 200 panzers and conscious of his supply line back to Tripoli stretching a thousand miles, significantly over-estimated the British strength and postponed his attack until the night of 30 August, but it failed at Alam Halfa. His plan had been betrayed by
ULTRA
, thus allowing the 8th Army to reinforce the precise focus of attack, the Alam Halfa ridge with 400 tanks, 300 anti-tank guns, 350 field-guns and huge minefields. In terms of strategic deception, âA' Force invented
RAYON
, a supposed plan to invade Crete which required Greek troops in Egypt to be mobilised. The intention, at the very least, was to prevent Rommel from drawing reinforcements from the German forces on the occupied island, and this certainly happened, as demonstrated by an Afrika Korps assessment of the Allied order-of-battle which included the fake 74th Armoured Brigade joining the genuine 7th Armoured Division.
The other âA' Force strategic objective was to apply maximum pressure on Rommel's supply route from Italy, which in turn meant support for Malta, then besieged by the Luftwaffe and the Italian Regina Marina. The four submarines of the 10th Flotilla operating from HMS
Talbot
in Valetta's Grand Harbour, HMS
Unbroken, United, Unruffled
and
Unrivalled
took a heavy toll of Axis shipping, up to half of the cargo ships and two-thirds of the tankers, on which the Afrika Korps was wholly dependent for food, ammunition, fuel
and replacements, so Malta's survival was a high priority for the Allies. The Royal Navy, with the benefit of well-protected submarine pens and high-grade intelligence derived from
ULTRA
, proved so successful in handicapping the enemy's supply line that the Germans developed a plan, codenamed
HERKULES
, to bomb the island into submission and execute a joint paratroop and amphibious assault, thereby eliminating the menace. However, the project was abandoned when it was realised that such an undertaking would siphon off too many resources from the increasingly hard-pressed Afrika Korps. By the end of the war the 10th Flotilla had fired 1,289 torpedoes, with an estimated hit-rate of 10 per cent.
Allied attempts to deliver vital supplies to Malta, from Gibraltar in one direction and Alexandria on the other, had failed. Both convoys,
HARPOON
from the west and
VIGOROUS
from the east, had been disasters.
HARPOON
was under attack for two full days, and four of the six cargo ships sunk, along with a cruiser and five destroyers.
VIGOROUS
was an even greater catastrophe, and returned to Alexandria after the loss of a cruiser, HMS
Hermione
, and five destroyers.
A third mission, codenamed
PEDESTAL
, was planned for August 1942, in the knowledge that another failure would leave the island, which had endured 3,000 air raids in two years, undefended from the air because of a lack of aviation fuel for the island's Spitfires operating from Luqa and its satellite fields. Surrender was contemplated, so
PEDESTAL
'
S
fourteen merchantmen were protected by a huge escort on an unprecedented scale, which included two battleships, three aircraft carriers, seven cruisers and thirty-two destroyers. The Italians attacked in force, but suffered heavy losses, and HMS
Unbroken
severely damaged the German tanker
Regina
, the heavy cruiser
Bolzano
and the light cruiser
Muzio Attendolo
with torpedoes, putting all three permanently out of action.
The assembly and departure of such a vast concentration of naval
force was next to impossible to disguise, especially as it transited the Straits of Gibraltar, so the deception planners tried to divert the enemy's attention to the eastern Mediterranean and promote the impression that the Allies intended to launch an invasion of Crete from Cyprus. This was reported by
CHEESE
which resulted in Luftwaffe and Regia Aeronautica Italiana reconnaissance flights being sent over Larnaca, Limassol and Famagusta to photograph landing craft and other preparations associated with amphibious operations. Evidently the combined evidence persuaded the Axis intelligence analysts who diverted Regina Marina surface vessels from engaging
PEDESTAL
, in preference to preparing for a major battle in Crete. In consequence, five of the
PEDESTAL
merchantmen reached their destination, including the SS
Ohio
carrying the vital aviation fuel, thus allowing Malta to survive. In David Mure's view,